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ABSTRACT
Globally as well as in China, cities have contributed to most of economic output and have
accordingly given rise to most of CO2 emissions. In particular, given unprecedented urbanization,
cities will play an even greater role in shaping energy demand and CO2 emissions. Therefore,
cities are the key to meeting its proposed carbon intensity target in 2020 and whatever climate
commitments beyond 2020 that China may take. Given the paramount importance of cities,
China is practicing low carbon city (LCC) development. Against this background, this paper first
summarizes the general situation and main characteristics of China’s LCC development. The
paper then indentifies eight problems and challenges for China’s LCC development including the
absence of sound carbon accounting systems, lack of low-carbon specific evaluation system, rare
use of market-based instruments, insufficient government-enterprise interactions, excessive
budget dependence on land concession, increasing difficulty in further carbon mitigation,
inevitable emissions growth due to rising living standards, and coal-dominant energy structure in
the foreseeable future. Since these challenges are not applied to one or few cities, but are to all
cities across the country, finally, the paper discusses how governments, in particular the central
government, should address these problems and challenges. Given that China has faced great
difficulty ensuring that local governments act in accordance with centrally-directed policies, the
paper in particular discusses ways to incentivize local governments not to focus on economic
growth alone and to move away from a heavy reliance on land concession. The paper ends with
emphasizing on putting a price on carbon a crucial step for China’s endeavor of harnessing the
market forces to reduce its energy consumption and carbon emissions and genuinely transiting
into a low-carbon economy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Low carbon development is one of the key models proposed and being practiced globally for
combating climate change. Many cities including mega-cities like London, New York and Tokyo
have taken actions and played leading roles in low-carbon city (LCC) development even without
national policies or commitments(Liu et al., 2012). Cities are the key to meeting carbon reduction
targets (Word Bank, 2011). First, cities are the main contributors of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008a), cities emitted 19.8
gigatonnes of CO2e (GtCO2e) from energy use, or 71% of global energy-related GHG emissions in
2006. By 2030, this number is expected to climb to 30.8 GtCO2e, or 76% of global energy-related
GHG emission. Moreover, 80% of this 11Gt CO2e cumulative increase will come from cities in
non-OECD countries, mainly from rapidly urbanizing countries such as China and India. Second,
cities are uniquely important partners to address climate change because they are homes not
only to large concentrations of people but also to an agglomeration of productivity (OECD, 2010).
Last, local governments often have the authority to take prompt action that would influence GHG
emissions (Word Bank, 2011; Tang, 2009; Lei et al., 2011).
In China, cities contribute to more than 75% of the national economy in 2009, and this
number is expected to increase to 95% by 2025 (Dhakal, 2009). They are also responsible for
more than 60% of national energy consumption (Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2009). In the
future, Chinese cities will play a greater role in determining China’s energy demand and CO2
emissions given the fact that China is experiencing unprecedented urbanization. In 2011, China’s
urban population exceeded that of rural areas, and its urbanization rate is forecast to increase
from the current 51% to 79% by 2050 (ERI, 2009; Zhou et al., 2011a). During this process Chinese
cities will absorb about 400 million rural residents. As Dhakal (2009) shows, the ratio of urban to
rural per capita commercial energy uses in Chinese cities is 6.8, and the ratio between urban to
national average is 1.9.Those huge numbers of new migrants will demand greater energy use and
emit more energy-related GHG than their rural settlements mainly due to income rise and
lifestyle change. In this context, some positive steps have been taken to curb GHG emissions:
many cities in China are developing LCC initiatives that are expected to be strengthened due to a
mandatory target included in the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP) to reduce the carbon intensity by
17% by 2015, relative to the 2010 level.” The imperative to transit to low-carbon pathway has
been integrated into agendas for Chinese government officials.
These promising LCC activities inspire more and more scholars to carry out studies on LCC or
the low-carbon society in China (Liu and Deng, 2011; Glaeser and Kahn, 2010; Cai et al., 2012).
Most of these emerging studies, however, are broadly confined to theoretical and conceptual
discussions and lack short-distance observations of the policies and practices of LCC in China (Li
et al., 2010; Dai, 2009). In a practical way, Liu and Wang (2010) conclude that there are four kinds
of development patterns in the practice of LCC in China. The World Bank (2012) provides LCC
guidelines for actions that Chinese cities could take as well as many practical cases on low-carbon
development inside and outside of China. A similar analytical framework can be found from Zhou
et al. (2011b), Lei et al. (2011) and the Chinese Society for Urban Studies (2009). However,
research that provides conclusions on the policies and practices of LCC development in China and
identifies its existing problems through a well-grounded approach is scarce. Therefore, more
research that seeks to fill this gap may help shift China’s cities onto a low-carbon pathway.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two describes the general
3
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situation of LCC development in China. Section three discusses its main characteristics, including
geographical distribution, stage features, and China’s own particularities. Section four analyses
problems and challenges in the development of LCC, and Section five proposes countermeasures
from the perspective of the government, in particular the central government.

2. GENERAL SITUATION OF CHINA’S LCC DEVELOPMENT
The usual routine to develop LCC in China begins with a top-level planning which includes targets
for low-carbon development. Those quantitative targets help cities define, compare, and track
progress toward low-carbon future. So far, nearly one hundred cities in China have established
targets for LCC, with some listed in Table 1. Different from the absolute emission goals of most
cities in developed countries, most cities in China (with the exception of Hong Kong) adopt
intensity-based targets for LCC to allow for additional emissions growth due to expected
urbanization and industrialization. Also, short-term (2015) and medium-term (2020) goals are
common, while long-term (post 2020) goals are rare. This is consistent with the Chinese central
government’s commitment to voluntarily reduce carbon emissions per unit of its GDP (i.e.,
carbon intensity) by 40% to 45% by 2020 compared to 2005 level1.
Table1 Targets for LCC set by several cities in China
City,
Province

Baoding,
Hebei

Chengdu,
Sichuan

Wuxi,
Jiangsu

Xiamen,
Fujian

Planning
Documents
Baoding
government
notice on LCC
constructiona
Chengdu
work plan of
LCC
constructionb
Wuxi
planning of
low carbon
economic
developmentc

Master
planning for
Xiamen as a
low-carbon

Date of
publication

Targets (aggregated and sectoral indicators)

December
2008

By 2020, CO2e per unit of GDP should be 35%
lower than that of2010; CO2e per capita should
be controlled within 5.5 tonnes; value-added
from new energy industry should account for
25% of industrial value-added

January
2010

By 2015, CO2e per unit of GDP should decline to
1.15 tonnes; non-fossil energy consumption
should be more than 30% of the total; forest
coverage rate should increase to 38% or more

March
2010

By 2015, CO2e per unit of GDP of industry should
be 45% lower than that of 2005; renewable
energy consumption rate should be 20%; share
of urban public transportation should increase
from 22% to 32%; energy consumption of
buildings should be reduced by 45% relative to
2005 level

March
2010

By 2020, CO2e per unit of GDP should be 60%
lower than that of 2005; total CO2 emission
should be controlled within 68.64 million
tonnes; CO2 emissions from transportation,
residential buildings, public buildings, industry

1

See Zhang (2011a,b) for detailed discussion on stringency and credibility issues related to
China’s carbon intensity commitment and their Implications.
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cityd

should be curbed within 12.36, 6.53, 12.69 and
30.2 million tonnes, respectively

Tianjin

Tianjin
planning
combat
climate
changee

Guiyang,
Guizhou

Guiyang
action plan of
low carbon
developmentf

HongKong

Public
consultation
on Hong
Kong’s
climate
change
strategy and
actiong

Nanchang,
Jiangxi

Nanchang
work plan for
national LCC
pilot
programh

Beijing

Shanghai

to

Beijing 12th
five-year plan
for saving
energy and
addressing
climate
changei

Shanghai 12th
five-year plan
for saving
energy and
addressing
climate
changej

March
2010

July
2010

By 2015, CO2e per unit of GDP should be 0.169
ton/1000CNY, or 15.5% lower than that of 2010;
forest coverage rate should be more than 23%

By 2020, energy consumption per unit of GDP
should be 40% lower than that of 2005; CO2e
per unit of GDP should decrease from 3.77 in
2005 to 2.07-2.24 ton/1000CNY
By 2020, GHG emission should decline from 42
million tonnes in 2005 to 28-34 million tonnes;
CO2e per capita will decrease from 6.2 tonnes in
2005 to 3.6-4.5 tonnes.

September
2010

October
2010

By 2020, CO2e per unit of GDP should be
45%-48% lower than that of 2005;non-fossil
energy consumption rate should be 7%;the
forest cover rate should be up to 28%

August
2011

By 2015, CO2e per unit of GDP should be 18%
lower than that of 2010; CO2 emissions in the
industry sector should be kept at the level of
2010; the share of high-quality energy in total
primary energy consumption reaches to 80% or
above, with natural gas and new and renewable
energy accounting for at least 20% and 6%,
respectively; forest coverage rate in the built
area increases to 40%.

March 2012

By 2015, CO2e per unit of GDP should be 35%
lower than 2005; CO2e per unit of value added in
the industry sector should be 22% lower than
that of 2010; the share of non-fossil energy in
total primary energy consumption reaches to
12%; forest coverage rate in the built area
increases to 38.5%

a

http://news.bdall.com/epaper/bdrb/page/1/2008-12-24/01/46931230098875390.pdf, accessed 1June 2013.

b

http://www.chengdu.gov.cn/wenjian/detail.jsp?id=rqCjb9nR4OFMn1EJZiIF, accessed 1June 2013.

c

http://www.ssfcn.com/detailed_gh.asp?id=23408&sid=1573, accessed 1 June 2013.

d

http://wenku.baidu.com/view/872f490c76c66137ee0619da.html, accessed 1 June 2013.

e

http://www.tjzb.gov.cn/system/2010/05/05/000243884.shtml, accessed 1 June 2013.

f

http://wenku.baidu.com/view/5f59031fa300a6c30c229f31.html, accessed 1 June 2013.
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g

http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/tc_chi/climate_change/consult.html, accessed 1 June 2013.

h

http://www.fsou.com/html/text/lar/173250/17325052.html, accessed 1 June 2013.

i

http://www.bjpc.gov.cn/fzgh_1/guihua/12_5/12_5_zx/, accessed 23 August 2013.

j

http://www.shdrc.gov.cn/main?main_colid=327&top_id=312&now_id=345&main_artid=22207, accessed 05 June 2013.

In addition to setting targets for LCC, these cities employ appropriate policy instruments to
realize the LCC blueprints. Table 2 summarizes the common policies implemented by the
aforementioned cities, principally targeting the energy, industry, transportation, commercial and
residential sectors.
Table 2 Common policy objectives and contents for LCC in China
Policy
Objectives

Policy Contents

Adjustment of
industrial
structure

Gradually shut down or upgrade highly-polluting but low-efficient
enterprises in energy-intensive industries;
Undertake an assessment of fixed asset investment projects for energy use
and environmental impact;
Promote high-tech, high value-added industries; develop an equipment
manufacturing industry that supports low-carbon development;
Increase the investment in infrastructure construction in tertiary industries
to improve the service quality.

Upgrading of
industrial
technologies

Carry out an energy audit for key energy-consuming enterprises; impose
responsibilities of saving energy on enterprises; supervise and evaluate
energy conservation;
Encourage clean production; implement mandatory clean production audits
for large polluters;
Establish entry requirements for projects in industries, i.e. new projects are
required to reach the international or domestic advanced level of energy
efficiency;
Promote energy-saving technologies such as clean and efficient usage of
coal, renewable energy, carbon capture and storage, etc.

Improvement
of energy mix

Upgrade power plants with burning gas instead of coal; deploy new energy
such as solar energy, wind, biomass, and shallow geothermal energy;
Extend the use of solar energy in the production and use of fields;
encourage powerful enterprises to construct small-scale PV power stations;
Launch pilot programs of straw solidification and gasification development,
as well as straw power generation projects.

Encouragement
on public
transportation

Combine public transportation planning with urban planning, such as
retaining and widening sidewalks, opening up bus lanes, developing urban
rails, bus rapid transit (BRT), regular buses, etc;
Increase investment in public transportation, adopt economic instruments
such as prices, fees, taxes aimed at encouraging residents to use public
transportation;
Build transition between non-motorized systems and public rail systems to
facilitate the use of public transportation for residents.

6
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Enhancement
of building
energy
efficiency

Establish building energy-saving standards; set up an energy consumption
statistical system and energy audit system;
Integrate low-carbon concepts into building design and construction; give
priority to green, energy-saving building materials and technologies,
especially the BIPV (Building Integrated Photovoltaic) system;
Carry out energy-saving retrofit on existing buildings, starting with
government buildings.

Optimization of
urban form

Develop a dense and compact spatial strategy by utilizing land
conservatively and intensively;
Classify land resources into 3 categories: prohibited exploitation zones,
restricted exploitation zones, and optimized exploitation zones;
Make full use of the underground space.

The six policy objectives and their contents can generally depict the overall situation of LCC
in China. It is worthwhile noticing that those low-carbon means are not mutually independent,
but rather synergic (De Macedo et al., 2006). The literature (OECD, 2010) discusses the synergy
existing in low-carbon measures at the city level. Taking the relationship between urban form and
transportation as an example, land-use zoning policies that allow for higher densities and greater
mixing of residential and commercial use, helps reduce transportation distances and frequency,
and therefore the energy required for urban travel. In turn, transportation infrastructure polices
shape the demand for land (Wang et al., 2007). Complimentary policies between sectors is so
crucial that most Chinese cities scarcely make one-sided low-carbon efforts, but take
complementary and multifarious measures to build a comprehensive low-carbon society.
Although LCC in China is still at its initial stage, with much planning but few solid results, potential
synergy can be expected if those policy packages proposed in the planning are well carried out.

3. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA’S LCC DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Geographical distribution
The LCC under planning in China have formed into four regional clusters, namely the
Circum-Bohai-Sea region, Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta and the southwestern region (Fig.
1). The former three clusters are located in the developed eastern coastal regions, most of which
are in the middle, later, or even post stages (like Beijing, Shanghai) of industrialization. With
abundant sources of technology, capital, and manpower, these three regions have solid
foundations and strong motivations to promote a low carbon transition of city development. The
southwestern region is still in a relatively backward stage in terms of the economic development;
thus it shows great willingness to house the shifted industries from the eastern China (Wei and Bi,
2011). Developing LCC will promote new technology and emerging industries, which will
consequently enable it to synergize economic and environmental benefits.

7
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Figure 1 Geographic distribution and regional agglomeration of China’s LCC
Source: China Center for Information Industry Development ( 2011).
3.2 Stage features of policies and practices development
Currently, LCC initiatives are implemented under the central government dominated, top-down
administrative framework. During the past several years, national-level policies’ progress in
mitigating GHG emissions has propelled urban China to explore low carbon transition (Table 3). It
can be concluded from Table 3 that the determination of the central government to curb its
soaring GHG emissions and the guidance from National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) are keys in the enhancement of China’s LCC, which has become more comprehensive and
systematic.
Table 3 National-level policies promote local-level actions on climate change

Time
Before 2005

National policies

Responsibility
Transmission
Mechanism

No specific national goals
aimed at low carbon
development

Regional Practices
Few cities paid attention
to low carbon
development

8
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2005-2010

The 11thFYP set a
mandatory goal of a 20%
reduction in energy
intensity

Central government
signed agreements
with local
governments with the
enforced goal of
energy conservation
included

Shutting down backward
production capacity,
improving energy
efficiency and promoting
renewable energy
became the key issues of
local governments

November
2009

Before Copenhagen
Climate Conference, China
announced the goal of a
40%~45% reduction in CO2
intensity by 2020,
compared to 2005 level

Cities started a low
carbon campaign in
order to get potential
preferential policy

Many cities drew up plans
for LCC; special concerns
were given to new energy
industry

July 2010

NDRC initiated the first
batch of “5 provinces and
8 cities” LCC pilot program

NDRC directed the
pilot regions to carry
out LCC work in a
systematic approach

Pilot regions submitted
their work plans to the
central government with
explicit targets and
concrete measures
included

March 2011

The 12thFYP launched the
mandatory goal of a
cumulative 17% reduction
in CO2 intensity

Allocate the national
goal to provinces and
cities.

Low carbon development
has substantially changed
from voluntary action
toward compulsory
responsibility of each
region

December
2012

NDRC launched the second
batch of “1 provinces and
28 cities” LCC pilot
program

NDRC required the
pilot regions to
establish GHG
emission target
responsibility system

The second batch
proposed the targets of
total emissions as well as
the year to reach the
emission peak

Specifically，the low carbon development of Chinese cities has evolved from focusing on low
carbon industries toward a comprehensive transition, and from low carbon concept advocacy
towards actual actions. Those changes took place around the year 2010. During the 11th FYP
period, Chinese cities showed great enthusiasm for exploring low carbon development.
Regardless of their own industrial foundation and ability of scientific research, many of them
strived to develop a new energy industry with the belief that new energy was equal to “low
carbon” (Bi et al., 2009). Around 2010, as the central government embarked on an explicit and
ambitious attempt to reduce carbon intensity, and the NDRC initiated the first batch of the “5
provinces and 8 cities” low carbon pilot program, LCC in China began moving into an intensive
phase of testing a comprehensive and systematic LCC framework. This framework included
adjusting economic structure, optimizing energy structure, improving energy efficiency,
increasing carbon sinks and advocating low-carbon lifestyle. Fundamental work like GHG
emission accounting has also commenced. Furthermore, the mandatory national-level goal of
carbon intensity reduction in the 12thFYP has been allocated to each province. Thus, low carbon
development has substantially changed from voluntary action toward an enforced responsibility
of each region. To further scale up the low-carbon development pilot program, the NDRC
9
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launched the second batch of low-carbon pilots in December, 2012. In August 2013, the NDRC
approved the second batch of “one province and 28 cities” low carbon pilot program, covering
Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan and Qingdao. Combined with the first batch of low carbon pilot
program, six provinces and 36 cities’ low carbon pilot programs across China have gotten
approved by the NDRC.
3.3 Intensity-based targets for LCC
Table 4 displays CO2emission reduction targets of 10 typical cities worldwide, which range from
20% to 40% reduction in total emissions by the year 2020 or 2030, relative to the base year level.
Compared with targets in Table 1, it is evident that all cities in mainland China adopt
intensity-based targets while global developed cites take absolute emission cuts. This difference
can be explained by rapid urbanization in China. Feng et al. (2012) pointed out that urbanization
and its associated income rise and lifestyle changes are important driving forces for CO2
emissions growth in most regions in China. Therefore the continuing urbanization, along with
high economic growth, puts tremendous pressure on Chinese cities’ energy consumption and
CO2 emissions. This includes large-scale urban infrastructure construction, and higher per capita
carbon emissions brought by higher income and life quality enhancement. Such an unstoppable
tendency makes an intensity-based target reasonable, as it allows for additional emission growth
before the emissions reach the peak.
Table 4 Targets for LCC proposed by several developed cities worldwide
Reduction rate (%)
Baseline
year

2020

2030

2050

Absolute reduction
volume
(million tCO2e/yr)

BuenosAires

2008

-

30%

-

-

Chicago

1990

25%

80%

36

Hong Kong

2005

50%-60%

-

-

8-14

Los Angles

1990

-

35%

-

51.6

Madly

2004

20%

-

50%

-

New York

2007

-

30%

-

32

Seoul

2007

-

40%

-

-

Toronto

1990

30%

-

80%

22

Sydney

2006

30%

-

70%

-

Tokyo

2000

25%

-

-

-

City

Source: Climate Leadership Group (2009).
3.4 Exercising low-carbon concepts according to local conditions
As mentioned before, strengthening industrial restructuring and technological upgrading,
improving energy mix and energy efficiency, prioritizing public transport and promoting efficient
10
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public transport systems, and optimizing urban form are promoted in a comprehensive way
among low-carbon cities. Meanwhile, these cities have established their own development
models according to the stage of economic development and the endowment of local resources.
To illustrate, let us take several examples in China. Tianjin, a city dominated by heavy industries,
emphasizes industrial structure adjustment and industrial technologies upgrading by propelling
three batches of industrial self-innovation projects. Baoding, a city called the“ Chinese Power
Valley,” established six industrial clusters including wind power, photovoltaic (PV) power, power
storage, power-saving, power automation equipment manufacturing. Although the production of
these devices is energy-intensive, they are required in order to popularize renewable energy.
Dongtan, located in the China’s most developed city--Shanghai, is expected to be the first carbon
neutral district in the world, where heat and power is obtained from wind, biomass, waste and
solar PV power generation. Guangzhou, a city equipped with the most advanced metro system in
China, has invested RMB 9.1 billion in building five metro lines and purchasing 500 new buses
including 30 BRT buses. Xiamen, famously rated the China’s most livable city, is committed to
being a compact city by scientifically planning urban land use, constructing public and
non-motorized transport systems, and creating transport-oriented living and working facilities.
3.5 Heavy reliance on mitigation efforts from industries
Fig.2 illustrates the different mix of sector emission shares in one U.S. city (Portland, Oregon) and
a typical Chinese city. In terms of its sector mix, though Portland may not be typical for developed
countries, its GHG inventory exhibits a commonly high share of transportation emissions (38%),
followed by the commercial (25%), residential (21%), and industry (15%) sectors. Thus
low-carbon transport and low-carbon buildings are their main concerns. In contrast, GHG
emissions of Chinese cities are dominated by industry (69%), with smaller shares of emissions
from other sectors. A main reason for the high share of industry in Chinese cities is the strong
presence of heavy industry in many local economies in China, entailing special efforts from these
industries. For instance, experiences from the U.S. and Japan show that transport and building
energy-saving issues are on top of the list of LCC scheme (Dai, 2009). However, in China,
developing emerging low-carbon industries and popularizing advanced energy-saving
technologies could be a pivot of LCC strategies (Wang et al., 2005; Liu, 2012).
1%

1%

Industrial

9%

15%

Residential

12%

38%
21%

Commercial

9%
69%

25%

Transportation

Waste Disposal

Figure 2 Comparison of GHG emissions inventory by sector between Portland, Oregon (left) and
typical Chinese cities (right)
Source: Zhou et al. (2011).
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4. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FOR CHINA’S LCC DEVELOPMENT
It has been three years since the NDRC initiated low carbon pilot program. Is the performance of
the first batch of pilots up to the expectation? Due to the absence of a low-carbon specific
evaluation system, and also given the fact that these pilots are in the early stage of capacity
building and tools design, it is difficult at this point to exactly answer whether the first batch of
pilots are on the right track to reach low-carbon future. Though endeavors of those pilots are
really noticeable, it is generally believed that these pilots have not met with the NDRC’s
expectation, i.e. playing an exemplary role and developing innovative low-carbon development
way that would be of great value to other regions (Qi, 2013).
What explains such unsatisfactory results? First and the most important, many local
governments in the pilots gain limited awareness of low-carbon development since they bear
great burden of developing economy during the process of rapid industrialization and
urbanization. In fact, their real motives for developing LCC are to get the preferential policies and
financial support from the central government, which would help attract more investment and
promote local economy. Aiming at sheer economic growth at the expense of environment had
led China to miss its energy-saving goal in 2010, thereby having huge implications for meeting its
LLC development goals. How to incentivize local governments not to focus on economic growth
alone is beyond the scope of LCC development and it is actually a problem of political-economic
institution. It is not only applying to low-carbon development in cities, but more general in nature
as it involves cooperation between central and local governments in the context of government
decentralization, and also the tax sharing system (Zhang, 2012a). To address this problem is
challenging but crucial to achieve the desired goal, which can be found in the final discussion part.
Second, developing LCC is completely new for pilots. They start from scratch and learn as they go.
Fundamental work like establishing a carbon accounting system and performance evaluation
system is under development. A variety of policy tools such as demand-and-control measures,
financial stimulus and market-based instruments remain to be further improved, and in particular
local governments’ capacity for designing market-based tools needs to be strengthened. Third,
generally speaking, due to rising living standards and coal-dominated energy mix, there will be
inevitable emissions growth for most Chinese cities, implying challenges ahead to further
mitigate GHG emissions. Those problems and challenges are not only applied to pilot cities, but
are to all cities across the country.
4.1 Absence of sound carbon accounting systems
A well-designed carbon accounting system is the key to a low-carbon transition because of its
numerous benefits: assisting policy makers in gaining an in-depth understanding of the real
situation so as to explore specific ways to problems, helping quantify and evaluate the effects of
policies, preparing the cities or sectors for emission trading, etc. Unfortunately, to date there is
still no standardized or nationally recognized accounting system for Chinese cities. Many
researchers suggest that establishing a sound accounting system for China should be a
prerequisite to realize a low-carbon transition (China Center for Information Industry
Development, 2011; Bi et al., 2009; Han et al., 2012; Guan et al. 2012; Cai et al. 2013; Wang et al.,
2013). In fact, the accounting system has barely begun, not only on the local level, but also on the
national level. The national GHG emissions database updated in October 2010 is the first publicly
12
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available database to include provincial level data since 1994. Nevertheless, there are
shortcomings for this top-down accounting approach. First, it is too broad to be applied to
organizations, firms or equipment, and thus fails to activate business and civil society to conduct
emission reduction activities (Chen, 2011). Second, in China there is a risk of emission
misrepresentation accompanied by poor quality of energy data due to the opacity of the
statistical approach of data collection including reporting, validating, and other institutional
factors (Guan et al., 2012). Hence, the irregularities and distortions of emission data create
difficulties and challenges for target allocation and domestic trading at the nation level.
4.2 Lack of low-carbon specific evaluation system
A comprehensive and specific evaluation system will help cities tell right from wrong. For instance,
improving the energy efficiency through adoption of efficient technologies is a good practice for
LCC development, while it is bad to fulfill their target responsibility by hastily moving those
energy-intensive industries out of jurisdictional boundaries. Unfortunately, to date LCC evaluation
system only demonstrates the top-level indicators including energy efficiency, carbon intensity,
percentage of non-fossil energy and forest cover, as Table 1 shows. Such a generalized evaluation
system leaves rooms for carbon leakage in the context of differentiated climate abatement
commitments among cities. Carbon leakage refers to the phenomenon that carbon-intensive
firms transfer from policy-restricted regions to less regulated regions, resulting in the failure of
controlling emissions2. In China, under the pressure derived from policies of energy conservation
and emission reduction, many energy-consuming firms practice interregional transfer from the
east to the west (Wei and Bi, 2011). For example, during 2008 and 2010, Inner Mongolia received
754 projects with a total production value of RMB 551 billion from eastern regions (Miao et al.,
2012), and in 2009 Henan Province took over foreign and domestic investment of RMB 250 billion
with petrochemical projects being the main contribution (Wu, 2010). What is worse is that when
those shifted firms relocate factories they usually expand production capacity at the same time
(Sun, 2010).
The theories of market failure and policy failure can be applied to explain carbon leakage.
First, the cost of GHG effects is not integrated into the production cost of individual firms, and
policies aimed to internalize this external cost will increase the overall cost for firms. Driven by
profit maximization, firms will try hard to avoid the carbon cost by moving to the less
policy-regulated regions. Second, local governments have significant autonomy to clear the
energy-intensive but economy-inefficient firms out of jurisdictional boundaries with
administrative power, so as to meet their energy-saving targets. Therefore, it is important to
include comprehensive market mechanisms that eliminate externalities brought about by GHG
emissions, as well as strengthen supervision from the supervising authority in order to make
mitigation efforts that really matter.
4.3 Rare use of market-based instruments
As previously mentioned, China’s approach to controlling GHG emissions has relied on a
top-down, direct regulatory system, to a large extent through command-and-control measures.
2

Zhang (2012b) provides a comprehensive review of carbon leakage and the effectiveness of
anti-leakage policies associated with differentiated climate abatement commitments among
countries.
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Economic instruments such as carbon taxes, carbon trading, carbon offsets and energy
performance contracting (EPC) have played a very limited role (Wu, 2011). For example, during
the 11th FYP, the total CO2 reduction volume reached 1.25 billion tCO2e through mandatory
regulations and auxiliary financial stimulus, while only 0.035 billion tCO2e were reduced through
market-based instruments (Qi, 2011). Another example is the low-carbon pilots. The
command-and-control measure and financial stimulus are their main tools. Major
command-and-control tools include phasing out obsolete production capacity, mandatory
standards, mandatory tasks, and standards for industry admittance. Low-carbon development
special fund is the most effective tool to provide financial support for the pilots (Qi, 2013). In
contrast, markert-based instruments are still in the stage of exploration and localities’ capacity
for market-based instruments design seems weak. Actually, compared with mandatory
regulations and financial funding, it needs greater institutional innovation to put a price on
carbon emissions (externality) and bring the carbon market into operation, given the fact that the
market mechanism in China is not sound and far from mature.
Objectively speaking, in the initial stage of low-carbon transition, mandatory policies are
more suitable for China. For one reason, a top-down framework takes full advantage of fitting
well with the Chinese administrative system. Another reason is that the current market in China
lacks spontaneity in terms of GHG reduction. In this context, it is necessary for the government to
establish regulations and provide economic incentives to drive the low-carbon transition.
Nevertheless, by applying mandatory regulations, China has achieved a limited success in
meeting the energy saving goal for the 11th FYP, and continues to face rising energy demand and
increasing difficulty in further cutting energy and carbon intensities. Having recognized the
limited efficacy of top-down approaches and the difficulties in sustaining their effects, China
began to look at market-based instruments as potentially valuable alternatives when moving into
the 12th FYP period (Han et al., 2012). With carbon trading still in its infancy, as a first step, the
NDRC initiated carbon trading pilots in seven provinces and cities aiming to create a functional
national system that would be in place by 2016 (NDRC, 2011).
4.4 Insufficient interaction between the governments and enterprises
As aforementioned, GHG emissions of Chinese cities are dominated by industry, and therefore
energy-intensive industrial enterprises are the key players in urban transition towards low carbon
development. Their involvement, however, is absent from the policy making process. This is
mainly because of the Chinese top-down administrative approach as previously discussed. In fact,
the enterprises implement the directives solely made by the governments, and often low-carbon
transition is treated by the enterprises merely as a political task or an excessive burden. An
analysis of the impact of policy at the company level is essential (Dieperink et al., 2004). A series
of empirical studies have been conducted to analyze company-level issues in China such as major
factors determining a company’s energy saving efforts (Liu et al., 2012), awareness and
acceptability of market-based instruments (Liu et al., 2013a), and affordability of energy-saving
policy costs (Liu et al., 2013b).
According to a survey concerning energy-saving issues on energy-intensive enterprises in
Shandong Province3, several important findings are derived as follows: (1) Difficulties of external
3

The survey was conducted by the School of Environment, Tsinghua University in 2011. There
are 57 effective samples, including 21 chemical enterprises, 12 iron and steel enterprises, 12 pulp
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financing, uncertainty of the quality of new technologies and high profitability expectation of
energy-saving projects are major barriers to private investment in energy efficient technologies.
Additionally, 82% of the surveyed companies could only accept energy saving projects with a
payback period of less than 3 years. (2) Respondents indicate a limited knowledge of
market-based tools for energy saving and carbon mitigation, and they think of those tools as a
threat to the increase of energy cost. Actually they are more familiar with financial stimulus
including subsidies, power price discrimination, and preferential taxation. (3) The responses of
companies to increases in energy costs vary from such positive countermeasures as energy
saving by managerial measures and investing in energy efficient technologies, to negative ones
like moving the factories to less carbon-regulated regions and production expansion to cut down
unit energy cost. As we can see, the bottom-up approach of policy analysis provides a unique
perspective in which the policy makers learn about the policy performers, making it necessary for
the Chinese government to interact more with the enterprises for the sake of more feasible and
pertinent energy and climate policies.
4.5 Excessive budget dependence on land concession
A dense and compact spatial development strategy emerges as a crucial strategy to reduce GHG
emissions (Yu, 2010). There have been growing numbers of empirical studies (Norman et al.,
2006; Grazi et al., 2008; Brownand Logan, 2008; Kamal-Chaouland Robert, 2009) confirming that
the spatial urban form has a critical impact on GHG emissions. A consensus of those studies is
that cities with higher densities and greater mixing of various facilities can enhance climate goals
while urban sprawl and groundless land-use zoning can lead to larger emissions through a variety
of different mechanisms. Urban land expansion rates that are higher than or equal to urban
population growth rates suggest that urban land is over expansive (Seto et al., 2011). It is found
that most Chinese cities are spatially expanding in a haphazard, inefficient, and unsustainable
way. According to the World Bank (2012), urban land has expanded faster than the urban
population in China between 1995 and 2008. A case study (Tan et al., 2005) of the Beijing–
Tianjin–Hebei region, whose urban system is the largest in China, also shows that the urban land
expansion rate was evidently faster than the urban population increase rate in this area from
1990 to 2010.
One of the causes for blind expansion of urban land outstand the local governments’ heavy
reliance on off-budget funds from land concession (World Bank, 2012; Dhakal, 2009). In China,
local governments are responsible for not only providing public services, but also for promoting
their local economies. Given that the central government only accounted for less than 25% of the
country’s total government expenditure but received over 50% of the total government revenue
in China (see Table 5)4, local governments increasingly face the burden of rapidly growing
and paper mills, 11 cement enterprises and 1 ferrous alloy processing enterprises.
4
Since the tax-sharing system was adopted in China in 1994, taxes are grouped into taxes
collected by the central government, taxes collected by local governments, and taxes shared
between the central and local governments. All those taxes that have steady sources and broad
bases and are easily collected, such as consumption tax, tariffs, vehicle purchase tax, are assigned
to the central government. VAT and income tax are split between the central and local
governments, with 75% of VAT and 60% of income tax going to the central government. As a
result, the central government revenue increased by 200% in 1994 relative to its 1993 level. This
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expenditures on financing urban infrastructure and urban development. This gap is generally
filled by various off-budget funds mainly raised by converting rural land or rural-urban fringe land
into urban use. Specifically, municipal governments acquire rural land at low prices set by the
state, equip the land with urban infrastructures, and then sell or auction the serviced land to
developers, thereby generating cash flow. This discrepancy between acquisition costs and sales
revenues is sizable, creating a strong incentive for local governments to develop land that often
far outpaces real demand. For example, the ratio of off-budget funds from land concession to
local governments’ total revenues in China rapidly increased from 36.2% in 2008 to 71.7% in
2010 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2009-2011). Another example is that the land area
for industrial parks is commonly two or three times larger than actual needs (World Bank, 2009).
The durability and almost irreversibility of buildings and infrastructures creates a lock-in effect on
urban long-term GHG emissions, creating reasons for concern regarding China’s urban sprawl
which is motivated by municipal financial incentives.
Table 5 Shares of the central and local governments in the government revenue and
expenditure in China, 1993-2009
Government Revenue
Year

Government Expenditure

Central
Government
(%)

Local
Governments
(%)

Central
Government
(%)

Local
Governments
(%)

22.0
55.7
52.2
49.4
48.9
49.5
51.1
52.2

78.0
44.3
47.8
50.6
51.1
50.5
48.9
47.8

28.3
30.3
29.2
27.1
27.4
28.9
31.5
34.7

71.7
69.7
70.8
72.9
72.6
71.1
68.5
65.3

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

led the share of the central government in the total government revenue to go up to 55.7% in
1994 from 22.0% in the previous year (see Table 5). In the meantime, the share of the central
government in the total government expenditure just rose by 2%. By 2009, local governments
only accounted for 47.6% of the total government revenue, but their expenditure accounted for
80.0% of the total government expenditure in China. On the one hand, to enable to pay their
expenditure for culture and education, supporting agricultural production, social security
subsidiary, etc, local governments have little choice but to focus on local development and GDP.
That will in turn enable them to enlarge their tax revenue by collecting urban maintenance and
development tax, contract tax, arable land occupation tax, urban land use tax, etc. On the other
hand, local governments seek off-budget funds from land concession to cover a disproportional
portion of the aforementioned government expenditure. Objectively speaking, this tax-sharing
scheme in China plays a part in driving local governments to seek higher GDP growths and
off-budget funds from land concession at the expense of the environment (Zhang, 2008, 2010
and 2011b).
16
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2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

52.4
55.0
54.6
54.9
52.3
52.8
54.1
53.3
52.4

47.6
45.0
45.4
45.1
47.7
47.2
45.9
46.7
47.6

30.5
30.7
30.1
27.7
25.9
24.7
23.0
21.3
20.0

69.5
69.3
69.9
72.3
74.1
75.3
77.0
78.7
80.0

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2010).
4.6 Increasing difficulty in further carbon mitigation
A number of studies have depicted the future carbon emission trajectory for China through
scenario analysis. As exhibited in Fig.3, despite certain differences, scenario results of those
studies all indicate a continuous decline in carbon intensity for China from 2005 to 2050, and also
a decelerating rate of such a decline, implying that there will be more challenges over time posed
to China in order to further mitigate GHG emissions. However, some exceptions to the
decelerating rate of decline in carbon intensity exist, such as the descending trend in scenarios of
ERI-ELC, UNDP-EA, IEA-Baseline which will be more notable after 2030. This presupposes that the
electric automobile, the fourth generation of nuclear power, CCS, and renewable energies are
deployed on a large scale, thus resulting in an enormous investment demand and an increasing
marginal cost of mitigation. Therefore, without technological breakthroughs, it is hard to realize
these ambitious goals, re-confirming the great difficulties in carbon mitigation for China. Take
the power sector as an example. In 2007, the energy conversion efficiency of coal-fired
generation units in China had already topped the world (IEA, 2008b; China Electricity Council,
2007). Considering the fact that the continuous progress in energy conservation and technology
deployment in the 11th FYP, mitigation potential from technical progress has become very limited
(Cai et al., 2008, 2010).

tCO2e/RMB10,000

3,50

LBNL-CIS
LBNL-AIS
ERI-Baseline
ERI-LC
ERI-ELC
UNDP-BAU
UNDP-EC
UNDP-EA
EIA-Ref.Case
IEA-Baseline
IEA-BLUE Map

3,00
2,50
2,00
1,50
1,00

0,50
0,00
2005

2015

2025

2035

2045

Figure 3 Scenario results of carbon intensity trajectory in China, 2005-2050
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Sources: ERI, 2009; Zhou et al., 2011a; UNDP, 2010; EIA, 2008; IEA, 2010.
4.7 Inevitable emissions growth due to rising living standards
Life quality improvement is closely related to rising incomes. With higher disposable incomes, the
lifestyles of urban dwellers become more energy intensive (Dhakal, 2009). Along with remarkable
economic boom since the 1980s, China’s CO2 emissions per capita have grown rapidly from 2.1
tons in 1990 to 5.4 tons in 2008, surpassing the world average level of 4.5 tons in that year (CAIT,
2012). When compared to developed countries, however, the gap of per capita economic output
and energy consumption is huge. For example, in 2008, GDP per capita in China was only 13% of
that in the U.S., CO2 emissions per capita were 17% of the U.S. value (CAIT, 2012). Thus,
continuous growth in per capita output and CO2 emissions is inevitable, considering the fact that
China will continue in the course of urbanization and industrialization for a long time.
The Kaya Identity (Kaya, 1989) provides an intuitive approach to the interpretation of
historical trends as well as future projections of energy-related CO2 emissions. From a historical
perspective, the energy intensity of economic output has dramatically decreased from 1990 to
2010 in four mega-cities of China, i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. Nevertheless,
economic output per capita has surged over the same period, resulting in a big increase in total
energy-related CO2 emissions (Dhakal, 2009). It is worthwhile noting that those four mega-cities
are highly urbanized and economically important, whose per capita CO2 emissions are well above
the national average level. Therefore, promoting economic growth and improving life quality
while curbing CO2 emissions poses a big challenge to large amounts of boom towns in China.
Looking into the future, Fig.4 displays the predicted average rate of change of total CO2
emissions and each individual Kaya component from 2008 to 2035 for China, OECD and
non-OECD countries. Worldwide, the most significant decline in energy intensity of economic
output is projected for China, at 2.6 percent per year. However, that decline is offset by the
projected increase in China’s economic output per capita, which grows by an average of 5.4% per
year over the same period, emerging as the most significant driver of positive growth in
energy-related CO2 emissions.
Among the four Kaya components, policymakers generally focus on the energy intensity of
economic output (E/GDP) and carbon intensity of the energy supply (CO2/E). Reducing growth in
per capita output may have a mitigating influence on emissions, but the government generally
pursues policies to increase rather than decrease output per capita, in order to advance such
objectives as life quality improvement. Combined with the results of Kaya decomposition, it is
justifiable to come to the conclusion for China of inevitable growth of CO2 emissions driven by
economic development and improvement of residents’ living standards.
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Carbon
intensity(CO2/E)

Energy
intensity(E/GDP)

Output per
capita(GDP/POP)

Population(POP)

CO2 emissions

5,4%

China
non-OECD

3,6%

OECD

2,5%
2,0%

1,7%
0,9%
0,3%

0,4%

0,2%

-0,4%-0,2%-0,4%
-1,5%
-2,2%
-2,6%

Figure 4 Average annual changes in Kaya decomposition components of CO2 emissions growth
for China, 2008-2035
Source: EIA (2011).
Note: Due to rounding, components will not sum exactly to total average annual growth rates

4.8 Long-term predominance of coal in energy mix
Coal overwhelmingly dominates China’s energy mix, accounting for approximately 70% of China’s
total primary energy consumption (TPEC) in China in 2011, which is significantly higher than the
world average level of 29.5% (BP, 2012). In industrial sectors, 58% of final energy consumption
was supported by coal in 2007, while the corresponding world average is only 27% (IEA, 2009;
IEA, 2011). As for cities, GHG emissions from many Chinese cities are dominated by direct coal
use, as well as coal-fired electricity. In contrast, the inventory of a U.S. city is principally
composed of emissions from electricity, natural gas, and gasoline, all of which are less
carbon-intensive than coal (Fig. 5).
Unfortunately, China is expected to continue to be fueled primarily by coal use because of its
abundant supply, low cost and easy access. Thus, it is likely that this will lead to an inertia effect
of energy consumption. This viewpoint has been confirmed by many studies.Fig.6 summaries
their projections of the proportion of coal in China’s primary energy mix. Despite the continuous
decline in the ratio of coal consumption to TPEC, the predominance of coal in China’s energy mix
will remain until 2050. In a UNDP-BAU scenario, nearly 60% of TPEC is projected to be met by
coal in 2050, while only 32% is projected to be met by coal in the IEA-BLUE map scenario, the
lowest value among various scenario results. The reason for this aggressiveness is that the
IEA-BLUE Map scenario is uniquely target-oriented: it sets the ambitious goal of halving global
energy-related CO2 emissions by 2050, relative to the 2005 level. Therefore, it reflects that in
order to achieve the two centigrade goal, China is facing formidable challenges in energy
structure adjustment, particularly through the sizable reduction in coal use as suggested by the
IEA-BLUE map scenario.
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Figure 5 Comparison of U.S. (left) and Chinese (right) city-level carbon inventories by fuel
Source: Zhou et al. (2011b).
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Figure 6 The proportion of coal in China’s primary energy mix under different scenarios,
2005-2050
Sources: ERI (2009); Zhou et al. (2011a); UNDP (2010); IEA (2010).

5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
China has gradually recognized that the conventional path of encouraging economic growth at
the expense of the environment cannot be sustained. It has to be changed. To that end, China has
decided to cut its carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45% by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels,
and to drive its future energy use and carbon emissions below the projected baseline levels to
the extent possible.
Globally as well as in China, cities have contributed to most of economic output and have
accordingly given rise to most of CO2 emissions. In particular, given unprecedented urbanization
in China, cities will play an even greater role in shaping energy demand and CO2 emissions.
Therefore, cities are the key to meeting its proposed carbon intensity target in 2020 and
20
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whatever climate commitments beyond 2020 that China may take.
Given the paramount importance of cities, China is practicing low carbon city development.
All these cities have set energy-saving and carbon-curbing targets. To accomplish these goals,
they are making efforts towards strengthening industrial restructuring and technological
upgrading, improving energy mix and energy efficiency, prioritizing public transport and
promoting efficient public transport systems, and optimizing urban form. In this process,
however, cities have confronted with a variety of problems and challenges. They include, but are
not limited to, the absence of sound carbon accounting systems, lack of low-carbon specific
evaluation system, rare use of market-based instruments, insufficient government-enterprise
interactions, excessive budget dependence on land concession, increasing difficulty in further
carbon mitigation, inevitable emissions growth due to rising living standards, and long-term
coal-dominant energy structure. These challenges are not applied to one or few cities, but are to
all cities across the country. Some challenges are related to LLC development, but some are more
general in nature.
The government (mainly referring to the central government) should develop technical
guidelines for LCC to solve the problems commonly existing in the local-level LLC development,
especially designing a sound carbon accounting system that is nationally recognized and easy to
apply; strengthen supervision on the localities from the central government by providing
direction and rewarding good practice, etc.), and in relation to this, a benchmarking and
evaluation system (e.g., a comprehensive set of performance indicators) for low-carbon urban
development among cities should be established to monitor, track and evaluate how cities are
performing in LCC development; and attach importance to interaction with the enterprises by
constructing a feasible policy framework fully considering both administrators’ feasibility and
performers’ acceptability. As for cities in less developed regions who are incapable of effectively
implementing LLC due mainly to lack of financial support, the central government should
establish a fund earmarked on LLC development, supplemented with contributions from
provincial governments.
Moreover, China mostly relied on administrative means to achieve its energy-saving goal for
2010. The country has had a limited success in meeting that goal, and continues to face rising
energy demand and increasing difficulty in further cutting energy and carbon intensities. It is
becoming increasingly crucial for China to harness market forces to reduce its energy
consumption and cut carbon and other conventional pollutants and genuinely transit into a
low-carbon economy. To that end, China is experimenting with low-carbon provinces and cities in
six provinces and thirty-six cities. Putting a price on carbon is considered a crucial step for such
endeavor. A carbon tax or a domestic carbon trading scheme, if established, will serve as a
cost-effective supplement to costly administrative means on which China has mainly relied to
meet its current energy saving goal. In case of a domestic carbon trading scheme, the key issue is
its scope and coverage. Given the fact that the costs of abating carbon emissions differ
significantly among emissions sources cross provinces and sectors, having broad coverage of
emissions sources from all industries nationwide creates a means of obtaining low-cost
abatement options, thus minimizing the total cost of achieving the national energy-saving and
emissions goals. This is an ideal option. In practice, however, a carbon trading in China would
have to start from selected sectors or regions, although the limited scope and coverage will
reduce its cost-effectiveness, because China needs a reasonable length of time to develop and
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operate a national carbon market. This explains why a carbon trading scheme in China is initially
of limited scope and coverage, with 7 pilot carbon trading in two provinces and five cities
currently under development and an aim to establish a national carbon trading scheme by 2016.
However, in terms of timing, given that China has not levied environmental taxes yet, it is better
to introduce environmental taxes first, followed by carbon taxes, not least because such a
distinction will enable China to disentangle additional efforts towards carbon abatement from
those broad energy-saving and pollution-cutting ones. To be effective, either of market-based
instruments requires a sound carbon accounting system in place. For a carbon trading scheme,
the cap on emissions is required. There is an encouraging sign that several cities in the second
batch of LLC pilot program are proposing when their emissions reach the peak. Once these are
decided, it will help to set a cap on emissions for these cities, and enable them to establish a
carbon trading scheme.
The country has faced great difficulty ensuring that local governments act in accordance
with centrally-directed policies, since the past three decades of economic reforms have
witnessed a shift in the control over resources and decision making to local governments (Zhang,
2012a). This challenge is more general in nature, not only applying to LLC development in cities.
Rather, it involves cooperation between central and local governments in the context of
government decentralization. This not only had led China to miss its energy-saving goal in 2010,
but also has huge implications for meeting its LLC development goals. Clearly, the central
government needs to set appropriated incentives to get local governments’ cooperation. One
way to incentivize local governments not to focus on economic growth alone and ensure that
local officials are held accountable for energy saving and pollution cutting in their cities is
developing sustainable municipal finance mechanisms that move away from a reliance on land
concession. The central government really needs to cultivate steady and sizeable sources of
revenues for local governments. Enacting property taxes or real estate taxes for local
governments is urgently needed. Broadening the current coverage of resource taxation and
significantly increasing the levied level also helps to increase local government’s revenues while
conserving resources and preserving the environment. The resource tax levied on crude oil and
natural gas by revenues rather than by existing extracted volume, which was applied nationwide
since November 2011, is the first step in the right direction. However, the current coverage of
resource taxes is too narrow, falling far short of the purposes of both preserving resources and
protecting the environment. Thus, overhauling resource taxes includes broadening their coverage
so that more resources will be subject to resource taxation.
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